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Abstract. How is efficiency affected when demand excesses over supply are signalled through waiting
in queues? We consider a class of congestion games with a nonatomic set of players of a constant mass,
based on a formulation of generic linear programs as sequential resource allocation games. Players
continuously select activities such that they maximize linear objectives interpreted as time-average of
activity rewards, while active resource constraints cause queueing. In turn, the resulting waiting delays
enter in the optimization problem of each player.
The existence of Wardrop-type equilibria and their properties are investivated by means of a potential
function related to proportional fairness. The inefficiency of the equilibria relative to optimal resource
allocation is characterized through the price of anarchy which is 2 if all players are of the same type
(∞ if not).
1 Introduction
In crowdsourcing, access, and sharing economies, a large number of individuals interact to exchange goods
and services, with each individual pursuing his or her own interest. The matching of supply and demand
takes place in shorter times than in traditional product-service economies, so mismatches may be manifested
also in non-monetary terms as congestion. For example in ride-hailing, it is common for drivers to face
significant waiting delays until they are matched with a customer, if the number of available drivers in
an area exceeds local demand. In this paper we consider a class of nonatomic games, and the appropriate
equilibrium concept, which capture the noncooperative behavior and congestion effects in resource allocation
settings such as above.
There is a large literature on congestion games [15], which examine the interaction between congestion
and noncooperative behavior. In the case where the number of players is large and each has a negligible effect
on congestion, nonatomic congestion games view players as a continuous mass whose equilibrium behavior
is described by Wardrop-type equilibria, first studied for road traffic in [3, 18]. In this paper we consider a
similar case but with a constant player mass playing a sequential game.
To illustrate the difference consider the example in Fig. 1, which resembles Pigou’s selfish routing exam-
ple [14]. Players flow from left to right utilizing routes 1 (upper) and 2 (lower). Traversal of the upper route
offers reward 2 while the lower route a unit reward. Let xi be the rate of players flowing through route i,
and assume the maximum rate at which players can flow through route is 1, i.e., x1 ≤ 1. Route 2 is not
rate limited and the delay is always 1. The players do not exit the system after a traversal; they return back
to the origin on the left and keep circulating. Assume the mass of players in the system is equal to 2. A
basic difference with Pigou’s example is that the delay of route 1 is not a function of the flow there. It is
expressed as 1 + w where w is the additional waiting time players face if they accumulate in route 1 due
to the limitation in the flow rate. If x1 < 1, since the players behave as a fluid, they do not accumulate so
w = 0. On the other hand, if x1 = 1 then w is not a function of x1 anymore; it also depends on the player
mass currently on route 2, i.e., x2. The total mass is 2, so in route 1 there must be 2 − x2 players whose
mass is also expressed by Little’s law [12] as (1 + w)x1. Thus, w = 1− x2 if x1 = 1.
What flows x1, x2 will result from a ‘selfish circulation’? Players will prefer the upper route as long as the
reward per round-trip is higher than that offered by the lower route, i.e., 21+w ≥ 1. If x1 = 1, this is always
the case if x2 > 0 since w = 1 − x2 and hence 21+w = 1 + x21+w > 1. In fact, the entire mass of players can
utilize the upper route, in which case w = 1, and still make that route at least as preferrable as the lower
one. Thus, x1 = 1, x2 = 0 is an equilibrium, and is easy to see that it is the only one. The long-run average
total reward resulting from the equilibrium circulation of players is 2 (or 1 per unit of player mass). This is
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Fig. 1. Selfish circulation of a constant mass of nonatomic players which maximize their average reward per unit
time. The waiting delay w is 0 if x1 < 1.
less that the maximum possible reward, obtained by solving:
max 2x1 + x2 (1)
such that x1 ≤ 1,
x1 + x2 = 2,
over x1, x2 ≥ 0,
(Note that in the mass constraint x1 + x2 = 2 we do not need to account for waiting players as those can
always be assigned more profitably on route 2.) Its (obvious) optimal solution, x∗1 = 1, x
∗
2 = 1, yields 3 as
average reward (or 1.5 per unit mass), as the use of route 2 increases the average reward by 50%.
More generally, we take arbitrary linear programs with a single ‘mass constraint’, similar to (1), as our
point of departure, and consider a selfish circulation of nonatomic players which select activities that max-
imize their time-average rewards, given by the objective function. The inequality constraints correspond to
resource constraints, which when active, cause waiting delays. The latter include all the relevant information
a player needs to know about the other players’ strategies in order to maximize his or her own time-average
rewards, by solving a dynamic program.
In this respect, our work is related to the stationary anonymous sequential games in [19] where the
players are aware of how the other players are distributed over strategies, and maximize their time-average
payoffs. The equilibria in these systems are similar to our Definition 2 except that we allow the inclusion
of ‘balance’ constraints, which are private to each player without additional private state variables (see
Section 2). Another difference with the literature on anonymous sequential games is that the existence of
equilibrium there is established using nonconstructive compactness arguments (see [6, 19]).
In Section 4 the existence and uniqueness properties are established by means of a potential function the
players unknowingly maximize, which is markedly different from the objective of the linear program. For
example, the optimization problem corresponding to (1) is:
max 2 log(2x1 + x2)− x1 − x2
such that x1 ≤ 1,
over x1, x2 ≥ 0,
with the sole optimal solution being the equilibrium flow x1 = 1, x2 = 0. As the optimal solutions in the
two optimization problems in general do not coincide, the time-average rewards in equilibria will be strictly
lower. The largest possible ratio of the maximum reward over the reward at equilibrium, called the price of
anarchy, is a measure of the inefficiency of equilibrium, first proposed by Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou
in [11]. For nonatomic congestion games, the price of anarchy has been first computed in [16] for various
families of delay functions. In Proposition 2 we establish that the price of anarchy is 2, attained in the limit
of a sequence of simple examples, similar to that above.
In Section 3 we consider examples from three areas: ride-hailing, crowdsourcing platforms, and interacting
semi-Markov decision processes. For each case, we give example formulations as resource allocation games
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and obtain some new results. In [5] the authors consider the optimization of fluid model of a ride-hailing
system, where mismatches of demand and supply cause waiting delays similar to fluid queues, but no gaming
aspects are explored. This is done in [2] where a concept of equilibrium similar to ours is defined for the two
strategies of whether to circulate (with routing fixed) or not. [4] considers routing as part of the strategy set
and establishes existence of equilibrium in symmetric systems with identical players. Corollary 1 in Section 4
extends the results of [4] for arbitrary network topologies and multiple player types.
The statements and proofs of the main results are given in Section 4, followed by discussion in Section 5.
2 A Linear Resource Allocation Game
A mass dl > 0 of type l = 1, . . . , L players generate value by performing a set of J activities which consume
I resources. For a type l player, activity j ∈ {1, . . . , J} takes time tlj ≥ 0 to complete and consumes alij ≥ 0
units of resource i ∈ {1, . . . , I}. Let tl = (tlj , j = 1, . . . , J) be the column vector of activity durations, and
b = (bi, i = 1, . . . , I) where bi > 0 is the rate at which resource i is provided. Also, let x
l
j denote the total rate
at which each activity j is taken by all players of type l, and xl = (xlj , j = 1, . . . , J) be the column vector of
type l rates. Then the resource constraints are expressed as
∑
lAlxl ≤ b, where Al is a I × J matrix with
alij in its i-th row and j-th column. Each type l player receives reward c
l
j for completing activitity j. The
total reward rate for all type l players is expressed as cl
Txl, where cl = (c
l
j , j = 1, . . . , n) is a column vector.
The activities can be interdependent in the sense that the rates xl for type l satisfy Kl homogenous
balance constraints, i.e., Hlxl = 0, for some Kl × J matrix Hl with the element of the k-th row and j-th
column denoted by hlkj . Note that the resource constraints restrict the aggregate rates, whereas the balance
constraints restrict the strategies of each player.
Next, we define the activity rates which correspond to optimal resource allocation.
Definition 1. A vector of activity rates x∗ = (x∗l , l = 1, . . . , L) is optimal if it maximizes the total reward
rate, i.e.,
max
∑
l
cl
Txl (2)
such that
∑
l
Alxl ≤ b, (3)
Hlxl = 0, (4)
tl
Txl = dl, l = 1, . . . , L, (5)
over xl ≥ 0, l = 1, . . . , L.
If instead players act selfishly, each maximizes his or her own average reward rate. As activities are
assigned with no central coordination, players may have to wait before they can commence high reward
activities due to competition for the limited resources. Thus, players need also take into account the waiting
delay wlj before each activity j can commence.
Definition 2. A pair (xo, w) where xo = (xol , l = 1, . . . , L), w = (wl, l = 1, . . . , L) is an equilibrium if:
1. xol = (x
l
j , j = 1, . . . , J) is an optimal solution of
max cl
Txl (6)
such that Hlx = 0, (7)
tl
Tx+ wl
Tx = dl, (8)
over x ∈ RJ+,
for each l = 1, . . . , L.
2. ∑
l
Alx
o
l ≤ b. (9)
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3. wl = Al
T δ for a nonnegative column vector δ = (δi, i = 1, . . . , I) with δi = 0 if
∑
j,l a
l
ijx
l
j < bi.
In problem (6) the time-average reward is maximized from the perspective of a type l player: time is
split into either performing some activity or waiting for it (as suggested by (8)) while respecting the balance
constraints. Each player solves an instance of (6) for an infinitesimal mass in the righthand-side of (8), but
as optimal solutions are homogeneous of degree 1 with respect to the mass constant, xol gives the equilibrium
rates for the entire mass of type l players.
Resource constraints (9) are not part of the optimization in (6) as resource capacities b and aggregate
rates xo are not directly known to the players; resource exhaustion is signaled through the waiting delays
w instead. Condition 3 in Definition 2 requires the delays to be of a specific form which can be thought to
result from the following posited mechanism: tickets granting usage of single resource i units are handed out
from a booth for the respective resource at rate bi. Players of type l can start performing activity j once
they have collected all tickets for the resources required, i.e., alij tickets for each resource i. If δi is the delay
to obtain a single resource i ticket then the waiting delay wlj for collecting all the required tickets for activity
j is
∑
i a
l
ijδi.
We make the assumption that there always exist activity assignments with positive rewards for all types.
Assumption 1 (Feasibility). There exist nonnegative vectors xl, l = 1, . . . , L with
∑
lAlxl ≤ b,Hlxl =
0, cl
Txl > 0 for all l.
Also, we assume that all types have the incentive to participate under all possible waiting delays. For
example, this is the case when there is an outside option with a positive reward.
Assumption 2 (Participation). For every wl ≥ 0, l = 1, . . . , L, the maximum value clTxl in (6) is strictly
positive.
3 Examples
3.1 Ride-hailing
In this section we formulate a model for ride-hailing which fits into the resource allocation framework. In ride-
hailing systems a population of drivers transport customers to their destinations. We consider a geographical
area which we assume it is divided into a finite set of regions. Let bi be rate at which customers arrive in
region i, with a proportion qij of them requesting transport to region j. In the context of resource allocation,
customers are seen as resources.
The drivers constitute the players which we assume are of a single type with mass d. There are two types
of activities: i) a ‘busy’ activity, where the driver transports a customer who has been picked up from i to his
destination, and ii) a ‘free’ activity, where the driver chooses to move from i to j without carrying a customer.
Here it is assumed drivers cannot pickup customers from different regions, and any customers which exceed
the driver capacity in a region are lost. Notice that the ‘busy’ activity may involve waiting if the supply of
drivers exceeds the rate of arriving customers. Also, it does not include the customer’s destination as this is
typically not known to the driver before agreeing to serve the customer. A driver is compensated with ci > 0
per unit time for giving a ride originating from region i. Thus, the busy activity brings an expected reward
ci
∑
j qijtij , with tij > 0 being the transport time from i to j, while the free activity is not rewarded and
takes tij time to complete.
Let xi be the rate of drivers choosing the busy activity in i, and yij be the rate of drivers moving free
from i to j. Then, as the inflow and outflow of drivers in any region must balance, we have the constraint:
xi +
∑
j
yij =
∑
j
xjqji +
∑
j
yji,
for each i. The first term on the righthand side consists of the rate of busy drivers arriving to i after reaching
the destination of the customer that was picked up from j, for any j. Each busy activity ‘consumes’ a
customer, so we have the resource constraint xi ≤ bi for all i.
Corollary 1 guarantees the existence of an equilibrium (xo, w), where the average reward and the mass
of waiting drivers have unique values in all equilibria. The equilibria can be computed by solving the convex
optimization problem (15).
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Fig. 2. A ride-hailing system with d drivers comprised by three regions (depicted as arcs). Top: busy and free flows
(solid and dashed arrows, respectively) for d ≤ 2. Middle: for 2 < d ≤ 4 drivers find it still more profitable to queue
in region 1 instead of serving region 3. Bottom: for 4 < d ≤ 6 the queueing delay is sufficiently high so drivers start
serving region 3 which became equally profitable due to the high waiting in region 1.
Example 1. Consider an area with three regions as depicted in Fig. 2. Customers request transport from
regions 1, 3, with unit rate from each, towards the center region 2, i.e., b1 = b3 = 1, b2 = 0, q12 = q32 = 1.
For each trip transporting a customer from region 3, the driver receives a unit reward, while from region 1
receives double (c1 = 2, c3 = 1). Assume unit transport times between neighboring regions: tij = |i − j| for
any two regions i, j.
We observe three regimes, depending on the mass d of drivers. In the first regime, there is no waiting in
our fluid model to pick up customers in region 1. Serving continuously customers from 1 to 2 generates 2
units of reward per round-trip, i.e., an average reward rate of 1. This is higher than the 1/2 average reward
rate earned from serving customers from 3 to 2. Thus, all d drivers will choose serving region 1 provided
they can always pickup a customer on their return to region 1. This will be possible as long there are no
waiting drivers in region 1, and so d equals the number of drivers 2x1 on the forward and return trip. As
x1 ≤ b1 = 1, we must have d ≤ 2.
In the second regime, queues start foming in region 1, but are not long enough to motivate drivers to
serve customers in region 3. If d is just above 2, then the customer demand from 1 cannot support all drivers
and so some of them may wait. They will do so if the average reward (including wait) is less than the average
reward serving region 3 (in which there is no waiting.) At this point the total reward rate is 1 and does
not increase for small increases of d, even though the revenue stream from customers from region 3 is not
utilized. Clearly, this equilibrium does not maximize the total reward rate (2), and even more, it is not
Pareto efficient, i.e., the society of drivers as a whole could gain more by serving region 3 too and splitting
the total proceeds.
In the third regime, serving region 3 becomes a best choice due to the high delays in waiting for customers
in region 1. The mass d− 2 of waiting drivers grows, as d is further increased, until the average reward 2/d
equals the 1/2 reward for serving region 3, i.e., d = 4. If d > 4, the extra d−4 drivers all serve region 3 while
the queue at 1 stops increasing until d > 6 in which point queues in both regions will increase at the same
time while keeping the same average rewards.
In the above example, as the one in Fig. 1, the optimal rewards given by (2) and those at equilibrium
deviate. In Proposition 2 we show that the optimal value cannot exceed twice the reward at equilibrium.
3.2 Crowdsourcing
In crowdsourcing platforms, tasks which typically form small parts of a much larger effort, are executed
by many participants in parallel which may receive a reward for each task completion. The tasks vary in
their difficulty, time to complete, reward given etc., and so do the capabilities and task preferences of the
participants. The latter, typically select tasks in order to receive as high rewards as possible.
We can formulate a simplified model in terms of resource allocation as follows: tasks of type i are
generated at rate bi and correspond to a unit of resource i. Activity i concerns the processing of one type i
task. Participants, which are the players here, are of L different types, with the rewards cl, task processing
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times tl being dependent on the type l. One of the activities corresponds to idling and has 0 reward. Task
types which cannot be undertaken by a participant type, are assumed to bring a negative reward so that they
are never selected. Al are all unit matrices and there are no balance constraints as the tasks are assumed
independent.
Theorem 1 below, implies an equilibrium (xo, w) exists and the resulting aggregate reward cl
Txol attained
by type l participants, for each l, is unique. By Corollary 1, the waiting delay wlj is uniquely determined for
tasks with nonzero equilibrium rates, and given by (21).
How does the total reward
∑
l cl
Txol compares to the maximum possible reward when task assignment
is performed by (2), with the same participants? Notice that if all rewards of one participant type, e.g., 1,
are doubled while those of the other types do not change, xo remains an equilibrium as the relative rewards
between activities matter in players’ selection; not the actual rewards. Thus, there will be no increase in the
amount of tasks completed by type 1. This is not the case under optimal task assignment, as the change will
likely allow type 1 to complete more tasks (by having other types idle) because their rewards are part of the
system objective. The increase in optimal rewards may be arbitrarily larger than the increase in cl
Txol , as
illustrated in the following example.
Example 2. Consider L = 2 participant types, with tasks of a single type (besides the idling task) arriving
at rate 1. The rewarded value is 1/ and 1 for type 1 and 2 respectively, for some constant  > 0. The mass
of type 2 participants is 1/, while that of type 1 is unit. Hence,
max
1

x11 + x
2
1
s.t. x11 + x
2
1 ≤ 1,
x11 + x
1
2 = 1,
x21 + x
2
2 =
1

,
over x11, x
1
2, x
2
1, x
2
2 ≥ 0.
yields the optimal solution x11 = 1, x
2
1 = 0, with x
1
2, x
2
2 being the rates of the idling activities for each
participant type. This is expected, as the higher value type 1 participants generate more value than type
2, attaining total value 1/ and both types choose task type 1 since it is the only one generating positive
revenue.
On the other hand, the (unique) equilibrium has
x11 =

1 + 
, x21 =
1
1 + 
, w1 =
1

yielding total value 2/(1 + ). This can be formally shown either directly from Definition 2, or by Theorem 1
below, but it is expected because type 1 participants are a fraction  of type 2.
The ratio of the optimal to the equilibrium value, i.e., the ‘price of anarchy’, is 12 +
1
2 which approaches∞ as → 0.
3.3 Interacting semi-Markov Decision Processes
In this section we formulate a nonatomic game with players’ states evolving according to semi-Markov
decision processes (SMDPs), which interact through congestion effects due to linear constraints. Although
Proposition 1 below holds for players with SMDPs of multiple types, we state it for a single player type to
simplify notation. We then show that such games are instances of stationary anonymous sequential games [6,
19].
Consider an SMDP with a finite state space S and action space A. At each state i ∈ S, action a ∈ A
will make the process transit to j with probability paij after a random time with mean tia > 0, which is
independent of the past conditionally on the current state and action. A stationary policy is specified by the
probability p(a|i) of choosing action a once transitioning to i, for every i ∈ S, a ∈ A. We assume the transition
probabilities are such that the embedded Markov chain resulting from any stationary policy irreducible, so
in particular the SMDP possesses a unique stationary distribution (pii, i ∈ S). Under this distribution, let
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xia = dpiip(a|i) be the average rate at which action a is taken in state i, by d copies of the SMDP, all
following the same policy.
Let cia be the reward received for taking action a in state i. Action rates x = (xia, i ∈ S, a ∈ A) are
constrained by resource constraints of the form Ax ≤ b, for nonnegative I × |S × A| matrix A and column
vector b. As in the general framework, active resource constraints cause a waiting delay wia before action a
in state i can be taken.
We consider equilibria of the following form.
Definition 3. (p, xo, w) is an SMDP equilibrium if and only if:
1. The policy p = (p(a|i), i ∈ S, a ∈ A) solves the dynamic programming equation
V (i) = max
a∈A
cia + γ (tia + wia) + ∑
j∈A
paijV (j)
 , i ∈ S, (10)
i.e., the maximum is attained for any a with p(a|i) > 0.
2.
xoia = dpiip(a|i), i ∈ S, a ∈ A, (11)
where (pii, i ∈ S) is the stationary distribution under policy p.
3. Axo ≤ b,
4. w = AT δ for a nonnegative column vector δ with δq = 0 if
∑
i,a aq,iax
o
q,ia < bq.
Proposition 1. An SMDP equilibrium (xo, w, p) exists and the time-average reward attained by the policy
p is the same in every equilibrium.
Proof. SMDP equilibria directly correspond to equilibria of Definition 2, as (10) is equivalent to (6) for L = 1,
and set of activities S ×A. It is well known that the stationary policies p which optimize (10) correspond to
optimal solutions (y∗ia, (i, a) ∈ S ×A) of the linear program [7]:
max
∑
(i,a)∈S×A
ciayia
s.t.
∑
a∈A
yia =
∑
(j,a′)∈S×A
yja′p
a′
ji , i ∈ S, (12)∑
(i,a)∈S×A
(tia + wia) yia = 1, (13)
over yia ≥ 0, (i, a) ∈ S ×A,
where y∗ia corresponds to the rate action a is chosen at i under an optimal policy of (10). This implies
xo/d is an optimal solution, since it corresponds to p, by (11). Therefore, (xo, w) satisfies the conditions in
Definition 2 for balance constraints given by (12).
The converse is also true, as given an equilibrium (xo, w),
p(a|i) = x
o
ia∑
a′ x
o
ia′
, pii =
∑
a(tia + wia)x
o
ia∑
j,a′(tja′ + wja′)x
o
ja′
define a policy and the corresponding stationary distribution which give an SMDP equilibrium. From Corol-
lary 1, an SMDP equilibrium exists. uunionsq
If no resource constraint is active then wia = 0 for all i, a, and no interaction takes place between the
SMDPs. In this case the equilibrium policies achieve the maximum possible total average reward, and a
joint policy selection (control centralization) cannot produce a higher total reward. If some constraints are
active in equilibrium and waiting results then the average reward is strictly below the one possible under
centralized control. This drop due to decentralization, cannot be more than half because of Proposition 2
below.
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Relation to stationary anonymous sequential games: In stationary anonymous sequential games [6,
19], each player knows its own state and the distribution n = (nia, i ∈ S, a ∈ A) of player mass on state-
action pairs. The game between SMDPs is an instance of a (nonlinear) stationary anonymous sequential
game because the information on the aggregate, (x,w), and n are equivalent, through the identities nia =
(tia + wia)xia for each i, a.
Lemma 1. For each nonnegative n = (nia, i ∈ S, a ∈ A) with
∑
(i,a)∈S×A nia = d, there exist unique
x(n) = (xia(n), (i, a) ∈ S ×A), and w(n) = AT δ with δ ∈ RI+, such that
nia = (tia + wia(n))xia(n), for all i ∈ S, a ∈ A,
Ax(n) ≤ b, δT (Ax(n)− b) = 0. (14)
The mapping n 7→ (x(n), w(n)) is continuous.
Proof. Consider the optimization problem
max
∑
i,a
[nia log(xia)− tiaxia]
s.t. Ax ≤ b,
over x = (xia, i ∈ S, a ∈ A) ≥ 0.
A unique solution x(n) exists, as the objective is a strictly concave function maximized over a set with
compact closure and xia(n) > 0 unless nia = 0. By strong duality, (14) characterizes the optimal solution
with δ being the optimal solution of the dual problem.
The mapping n 7→ x(n) is continuous because the objective is continuous in n and x(n) is unique. The
continuity of w(n) follows from (14). uunionsq
Since the action delay wia(n) of a player taking action a in state i, are continuous in n, the existence of
equilibrium in Proposition 1 also follows from the time-average reward case in [19]. In Theorem 1 we give a
constructive proof which also yields uniqueness, based on a potential function for the game.
In the case paii = 1 for all i, a, the SMDP game becomes a finite strategy nonatomic (one-shot) game [13,17]
with the payoff of playing strategy (i, a) given by
cia
tia + wia(n)
=
ciaxia(n)
nia
, i ∈ S, a ∈ A.
The second case in Corollary 1 states that the equilibrium wia(n) is unique if xia(n) > 0.
4 Main Results
4.1 Equilibrium
Equilibria have the following variational characterization.
Theorem 1. (xo, w) is an equilibrium if xo maximizes
max
∑
l
[
dl log
(
cl
Txl
)− tlTxl] (15)
s.t.
∑
l
Alxl ≤ b, (16)
Hlxl = 0, l = 1, . . . , L, (17)
over xl ∈ RJ+, l = 1, . . . , L,
and w = (Al
Tλ, l = 1, . . . , L), where λ ∈ RI+ are optimal values for the dual variables of the constraint (16).
Under Assumption 2, for any equilibrium (xo, w), xo maximizes (15) and w is as above.
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Proof. Let (xo, w) be an equilibrium. Since xo maximizes (6), Assumption 2 implies it is also the maximizer
of dl log
(
cl
Txl
)
under the same constraints. The optimality conditions for this problem are:
1. (Feasibility)
Hlx
o
l = 0, tl
Txol + wl
Txol = dl, (18)
2. (First order conditions)
dlc
l
j
clTxol
− tljνl − wljνl −
∑
k
µlkh
l
kj ≤ 0, with equality if xlj > 0, (19)
for some values νl, µ
l
k of the dual variables, for each l = 1, . . . , L, k = 1, . . . ,Kl.
First note that multiplying both sides of (19) with xlj , summing over j, and applying (18) yields νl = 1.
For δ as in Definition 2, letting λ = δ yields
λ ≥ 0, λT
(∑
l
Alx
o
l − b
)
= 0 (20)
as well as wl = Al
Tλ. Thus, the conditions above are reexpressed as
1′) Hlxol = 0,
2′)
dlc
l
j
clTxol
− tlj −
∑
i
λia
l
ij −
∑
k
µlkh
l
kj ≤ 0, with equality if xlj > 0.
These, along with (9),(20) are the optimality conditions for the problem (15), which xo satisfies.
By proceeding in the reverse direction, it is easy to see that 1′), 2′), (9),(20) imply 1), 2), and so (xo, w)
is equilibrium for w as in the statement of the theorem. uunionsq
The linear term
∑
l tl
Txl in (15), which we refer to as the active mass, corresponds to the total player
mass that is engaged into any activity.
Corollary 1. 1. Under Assumption 1 there exists an equilibrium.
2. Under Assumption 2, the value cl
Txol rewarded to type l players and the active mass
∑
l tl
Txol , assume
the same values in all equilibria.
3. Under Assumption 2, if type l has no balance constraints, i.e., Hl = 0, the waiting delay w
l
j is uniquely
determined by
clj
wlj + t
l
j
=
cl
Txol
dl
, (21)
whenever xlj > 0 in any equilibrium.
Proof. By Assumption 1 the feasible set of problem (2) is nonempty, and it has a compact closure. Since the
objective function is continuous, a maximizing xo = (xol , l = 1, . . . , L) exists inside the closure. As the value
of the objective function tends to −∞ as clTxl → 0+, xo is feasible and so it is optimal.
Under Assumption 2 any equilibrium xo corresponds to an optimum solution of (15). Since the objective
function is strictly concave with respect to cl
Txl, the cl
Txol values are unique. As all equilibria yield the
same optimal value in (15),
∑
l tl
Txol is also unique.
Equation (21) holds because xlj > 0 results from (6) only if activity j’s reward per unit time, appearing
on the lefthand side in (21), is equal to the optimal one for type l on the right. (This is a restatement of
condition (19).) For every l, j with xlj > 0, w
l
j is unique because cl
Txol is. uunionsq
If the maximization in (15) is restricted to a constant active mass (by including the constraint
∑
l tl
Txl = d
for some d) then only the first term, the aggregate of logarithmic rewards, is optimized. This objective
induces a proportionally fair [9] distribution of value between players, i.e., any changes to activity rates
incur an aggregate of proportional value changes which is nonpositive. Therefore, the value distribution at
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equilibrium is the proportionally fair allocation under the additional restriction that the active mass is that
at equilibrium, i.e.,
∑
l tl
Txl =
∑
l tl
Txol . Note also that proportionally fair allocations coincide with the
Nash bargaining solution if disagreement entails nonparticipation.
In the single player type case, equilibria achieve maximum value when only the active mass at equilibrium
is allowed to participate. Let F (d′) be the optimal value of (2) for player mass d′, i.e.,
F (d′) = max cTx (22)
s.t. Ax ≤ b,
Hx = 0,
tTx = d′, (23)
over x ≥ 0,
where we have dropped the type index.
Corollary 2. Let Assumption 2 hold, and F (d) > 0. For a single player type with mass d, the equilibrium
xo is optimal for a player mass equal to the active mass at equilibrium, tTxo, i.e., cTxo = F (tTxo).
Moreover, the active mass at equilibrium is the unique d′ ∈ (0, d] with the property F (d′) = F ′(d′)d, where
F ′(d′) is a subgradient at d′.
Proof. By Theorem 1, xo, do = tTxo maximize
max cTxe−
d′
d (24)
s.t. Ax ≤ b,
Hx = 0,
tTx = d′,
over x ≥ 0, d′ ≥ 0.
If x is feasible in (22) for d′ = d then xd′/d is also feasible for any d′ ≤ d. As F (d) > 0, the feasible set
of (22) is nonempty for any d′ ∈ (0, d], and F (d′) > 0 for all d′ > 0. For d′ ∈ (0, d] fixed, optimizing (24) with
respect to x yields the optimal value F (d′)e−
d′
d which itself is maximized for d′ = do, and so cTxo = F (do)
as well.
Now,
−d
′
d
+ logF (d′)
is a concave function of d′ with the maximizing d′ characterized by F (d′) = F ′(d′)d for a subgradient F ′(d′).
As do is the unique maximizer, this equation identifies do uniquely. uunionsq
4.2 Price of Anarchy
For a single player type, we calculate the price of anarchy, i.e., the largest possible ratio of the optimal value
and value at equilibrium,
sup
d>0,c∈RJ ,A∈RI×J+ ,b∈RI+,H∈RK×J ,t∈RJ+,I,J,K∈N
s.t. Assumption 2, F (d) > 0 hold
cTx∗
cTxo
,
where x∗ is optimal, and xo an equilibrium, for player mass d. Assumption 2 and F (d) > 0 are used to ensure
the numerator and denominator are positive so the ratio makes sense. (For multiple player types the price
of anarchy is infinite, as shown in the example of Section 3.2.)
Proposition 2. The price of anarchy is 2.
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Proof. Since F , defined in (22), satisfies F (do) = F ′(do)d = cTxo by Corollary 2,
cTx∗ − cTxo = F (d)− F (do) ≤ c
Txo
d
(d− do) ,
by using also the concavity of F . Thus,
cTx∗
cTxo
≤ 2− d
o
d
≤ 2,
as do ≤ d.
To get a lower bound, for any  > 0 consider the following instance of (2).
max
1

x1 + x2
s.t. x1 ≤ ,
x1 + x2 = 1,
over x1, x2 ≥ 0.
The maximum value is 2−  achieved at x∗1 = , x∗2 = 1− .
On the other hand, waiting delays w1 =
1
 − 1, w2 = 0, induce xo1 = , xo2 = 0 as optimal solution of
max
1

x1 + x2
s.t. x1 + x2 + w1x1 + w2x2 = 1
over x1, x2 ≥ 0,
which saturates the resource contraint xo1 = . Thus, x
o
1 = , x
o
2 = 0 is the equilibrium with value 1 and the
cTx∗/cTxo ratio in this case is 2−  where  > 0 arbitrarily small. uunionsq
A way to force players pick activities which maximize total value as opposed to individual rewards, is to
use the shadow prices λ∗ of the resource constraints in (2) as resource prices. Under these ‘optimal’ prices,
activity j has net reward cj −
∑
i aijλ
∗
i .
Now, duality implies the optimal x∗ maximizes the Lagrangian of (2),
max
(
cT − λ∗TA
)
x
such that Hx = 0,
tTx = d,
over x ≥ 0,
and so (x∗, 0) is an equilibrium under optimal pricing, as Ax∗ ≤ b also holds.
We include this in the following result.
Proposition 3. Under optimal pricing, i.e., imposing a price λ∗i per unit of each resource i where (λ
∗
1, . . . , λ
∗
I)
are the optimal dual variables for the resource constraint in (2), the ensuing equilibrium yields the same value
as the optimal value in (2).
The value at equilibrium without optimal pricing is at least as high as the net value retained by players
under optimal pricing, i.e.,
cTxo ≥ cTx∗ − λ∗TAx∗.
Proof. Corollary 2 and the concavity of F yield,
cTxo = F ′(do)d ≥ F ′(d)d = cTx∗ − λ∗T b = cTx∗ − λ∗TAx∗,
where the second equality is by strong duality for problem (22). uunionsq
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5 Discussion
In ordinary, i.e., one-shot, congestion games waiting delays have the role of congestion cost, usually given
exogenously [15] or caused by randomness in the arrivals and service times [8]. The delays in equilibrium
correspond exactly to the Lagrange multipliers of flow balance constraints of an optimization problem max-
imizing the potential function of the game, e.g., see [8]. This is also what happens in Theorem 1 where the
delays are the Lagrange multipliers of the resource constraints in (15). Of course, this is a subsequence of
how delay is defined in the third condition of Definition 2 which is the complementary slackness condition for
these constraints. What is novel, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, is the use of the potential function
in (15) for sequential congestion games, where the delays are determined endogenously by constraints on
player mass (i.e., Little’s law [12]). In particular, the concavity of the potential function can be used in
showing that the best response dynamics coupled with the waiting delay dynamics due to queueing,
δ˙i =
1
bi
∑
l,j
alijx
l
j − 1,
converge to an equilibrium, by interpreting them as dynamics of a primal-dual algorithm for solving (15).
The linear reward structure is readily generalized to concave homogenous rewards by following essentially
the same proofs. In one-shot congestion games, inefficiency arises due to inhomogeneity of cost functions [16].
In games exhibiting both endogenous delays and inhomogeneous rewards it will be interesting to determine
how efficiency is affected by each.
The analysis in this paper may be useful in economic applications where both consumption and production
of resources takes place. Activities with alij < 0 can be thought
3 of as producing −alij units of resource i,
while resources with bi < 0 are as if they are being discarded with rate −bi. Such models are considered in
activity analysis, e.g., see [10], where the focus is in optimizing (2). This can be a daunting task because
the requirement of a centralized knowledge of production parameters is nonrealistic, and for this reason
activity analysis has been subsumed by general equilibrium models [1]. Nonetheless, an equilibrium concept
in activity analysis, such as the one considered in Definition 2 and Theorem 1, may be useful in cases eluded
by general equilibrium models. Namely, cases where the production decisions are decentralized and taken by
competing economic agents, as in crowdsourced production where prices may react slower to variations of
supply and demand.
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